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Summary by Covington & Burling 
Of the Major Points of Their Opinion
The following is a summary prepared by Covington & Burling, the 
Institute’s legal counsel, of its opinion of September 28, 1966, concern­
ing the legality under the United States antitrust laws of Rule 3.03 of 
the Institute’s Code of Professional Ethics. The full opinion appears 
on pages 12-25.
I.
1. Rule 3.03 is, in effect, an agreement among the members of the In­
stitute that they will not engage in price competition.
2. Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act prohibit all agreements 
among competitors restraining price competition.
3. Such agreements are illegal per se, that is to say, they cannot 
be justified on the ground that they are socially or economically de­
sirable as, for example, by showing that price competition has un­
desirable consequences or leads to unethical practices.
4. Rule 3.03 constitutes a restraint on price competition that is il­
legal per se under the Sherman Act, unless for some reason the Sher­
man Act does not apply to agreements among accountants in the same 
way that it applies to agreements among those engaged in ordinary
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commercial activities. This raises two questions: (1) does Rule 3.03 
affect interstate trade or commerce, and (2) to what extent does the 
Sherman Act apply to a profession such as accounting?
II.
1. The Sherman Act applies only to agreements and combinations 
in restraint of “trade or commerce” among the states or with foreign 
nations (Sec. 1) or in the District of Columbia or the territories or 
between such jurisdictions and elsewhere (Sec. 3).
2. There is no reason to believe that the courts would hold that 
the accounting profession is generally local or intrastate in character 
or that Rule 3.03 would be without impact on interstate commerce.
3. We conclude that the Supreme Court is likely to hold that mem­
bers of the professions are engaged in “trade,” within the meaning 
of the Act, and therefore do not enjoy any general immunity from the 
application of the Act.
4. We also conclude that, although the Supreme Court might 
apply more lenient standards to the regulations of professional so­
cieties than it applies to ordinary commercial transactions and hold 
that some kinds of regulations of such societies designed to preserve 
professional ethical standards are permissible, the Court is unlikely 
to allow the members of professional societies to engage in price­
fixing or to adopt rules of conduct that restrain price competition.
5. We therefore conclude it is highly probable that the courts 
would hold Rule 3.03 to be illegal.
III.
1. The possible legal consequences, if Rule 3.03 should be held 
to violate the Sherman Act, depend on the nature of the legal pro­
ceeding in which the violation is adjudicated.
(a) The Department of Justice could bring criminal proceedings, 
in which the penalties against each defendant could be a fine of 
up to $50,000, or imprisonment up to one year, or both, for each 
offense under each section of the Act.
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(b ) The Department could also bring a civil suit to enjoin the en­
forcement of Rule 3.03.
(c) The Department could also, in a civil suit, recover simple dam­
ages for any money damage suffered by the United States or one of 
its agencies that was caused by Rule 3.03.
(d ) Private persons, and states, municipalities and agencies thereof, 
could also recover treble the damages suffered by them that were 
caused by Rule 3.03, and could also obtain injunctive relief against 
the enforcement of the Rule.
2. Among the situations which might cause the legality of Rule 3.03 
to be raised in one or more of the above-described legal proceedings 
are attempted enforcement of the Rule against a member of the 
Institute and the inability of a governmental agency or public or pri­
vate corporation to obtain competitive bids.
3. It is not possible to estimate the degree of risk that any such pro­
ceeding will be brought. Reliance may not safely be placed, how­
ever, on the fact that the Rule is of long standing and has yet to be 
challenged in such a proceeding.
IV.
1. W hat has been said above applies equally to similar rules that 
may be contained in the codes of ethics of state societies, to the extent 
that such rules affect the conduct of members who are engaged in 
interstate commerce.
2. The Institute’s members will not, however, violate the Federal 
antitrust laws by obeying rules prohibiting competitive bidding pro­
mulgated by state boards of accountancy or similar official agencies, 
provided, first, that such rules are authorized by state law and issued 
in conformity with the legally prescribed procedures, and, second, 
that such rules are issued and enforced by an official agency that is 
established and controlled by the state.
November 19 , 1966
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Text of the Opinion of 
Cahill, Gordon, Reindel & Ohl
We are informed that competitive bidding by accountants is not 
in the public interest. It is persuasively argued that any such form 
of solicitation on the basis of price would shortly erode and eventually 
undermine the high standards of professional service which must be 
maintained by the members of this profession if they are effectively 
to discharge their obligations to clients, to creditors and to the general 
public. Rule 3.03 of the Code of Ethics of the Institute, accordingly, 
states that:
A member or associate shall not make a competitive bid for a 
professional engagement. Competitive bidding for public ac­
counting services is not in the public interest, is a form of solici­
tation, and is unprofessional.
We have been furnished with certain written opinions analyzing 
the legality of this Rule under the Federal antitrust laws, and have 
beep requested to set forth our conclusions with respect thereto. With­
out repeating at length the authorities there cited, accordingly, we 
will herein ask and answer three questions which we believed to be 
basic in our consideration of this Rule.
These three questions are:
(1) Is Rule 3.03 subject to the Federal antitrust laws?
(2) Does Rule 3.03 violate these laws?
(3) What, if anything, should be done about it?
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QUESTION ONE
Question: Is Rule 3.03 subject to the Federal antitrust laws?
Answer: The basic statute in the field of antitrust law, namely the 
Sherman Act, applies to every agreement in restraint of interstate 
trade in this country. Rule 3.03 is obviously “interstate” in its applica­
tion, because it is a regulation of an interstate association, it controls 
the operations of interstate as well as intrastate firms, and it affects 
the offer of services to interstate business corporations. The Rule also 
restrains “trade,” in view of the fact that it prohibits a form of com­
petition by self employed individuals and firms in the furnishing for 
profit of their services. In our opinion, accordingly, the Rule is sub­
ject to this antitrust legislation.
The fact that the business involves the sale of personal services 
rather than commodities does not take it out of the category of 
“trade.” (United States v. National Association of Real Estate 
Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950) at p. 490.)
Admittedly, no court has directly ruled that agreements between 
accountants—and thus Rule 3.03—are subject to the antitrust laws. 
These statutes, however, have in the past been applied generally to a 
wide variety of persons engaged in furnishing services, e.g., advertis­
ing, brokerage, cleaning, insurance, investment banking, licensing, and 
various forms of selling; they have been directed specifically to drug­
gists and doctors; and they are being invoked currently in a new 
investigation involving orthodontists and in a pending proceeding 
against pathologists. Any assumption that accountants and Rule 3.03 
are exempt from the antitrust laws would under these circumstances 
suggest the triumph of hope over experience.
QUESTION TWO
Question: Does Rule 3.03 violate these laws?
Answer: The courts have interpreted the antitrust laws, in proceed­
ings brought under the Sherman Act, to prohibit those engaged in 
an interstate trade from entering into agreements to refrain from 
competitive bidding. Executives, small businessmen and even local 
plumbers have been individually fined and sentenced to jail for en­
gaging in this form of competitive restraint. Rule 3.03, nevertheless, 
in express terms proscribes competitive bidding. In our opinion, there­
fore, the Rule is in violation of this antitrust legislation unless the
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courts exonerate a practice by accountants for which they incarcerate 
and fine other defendants. This, we believe, is unlikely to occur.
Any combination which tampers with price structures is en­
gaged in an unlawful activity. ( United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) at p. 221.)
The courts have, of course, acknowledged that competition in price 
under certain circumstances may be against the public interest. But 
they have heretofore stressed that only a duly authorized regulatory 
body of a state or Federal government may safely be entrusted with 
the power to make this finding, and in the exercise thereof, to restrict 
such price competition. The chances are slim that our courts will 
permit any self-appointed organization of private persons, such as the 
Institute—however well intentioned—to assert the governmental pre­
rogative of banning a form of competition in price. Indeed, the odds 
against the Institute’s obtaining ultimate Supreme Court approval 
for any such assumption of governmental authority are so over­
whelming that—while they might possibly appeal to the wagering— 
they should scarcely interest the accounting profession.
QUESTION THREE
Question: What, if anything, should be done about it?
Answer: Three courses of action with respect to Rule 3.03 would 
appear to be open to the Institute, in view of the answers herein given 
to the preceding questions. These alternatives may be roughly de­
scribed as “retention,” “repeal” and/or “replacement.”
(1) Retention: The members of the Institute may elect to reaffirm 
their claim to some unique antitrust immunity for Rule 3.03 and may 
therefore vote to retain it. If this Rule is thereafter invoked by the 
Institute or by any of its members to justify a refusal to submit a com­
petitive bid or to discipline a dissenting member who submits such a 
bid, however, such action will invite a petition by the enforcement 
agencies, by the adversely affected private persons, or by both, in 
which the courts will be requested to cut the tenuous thread cur­
rently holding the antitrust laws suspended over the Rule, and so 
to determine with finality whether or not they will sever that Rule. In 
falling, unfortunately, the antitrust sword may simultaneously impale 
the Institute and its members with injunctions, with treble damages 
and even with criminal penalties.
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(2) Repeal: The members of the Institute may instead elect to 
repeal Rule 3.03 and thereafter may rely upon other rules of the In­
stitute to insure the maintenance of the high standards of the pro­
fession. The American Bar Association has of course preferred to take 
this route and thereby avoid any direct confrontation with the anti­
trust laws. While a committee of the Bar Association in 1957 ventured 
an “opinion” adverse to competitive bidding by lawyers, it may be 
authoritatively asserted that any proposal to the Association suggesting 
the adoption of a legal Canon of Ethics comparable to Rule 3.03 would 
find little favor with the Section of Antitrust Law of that Association.
(3) Replacement: The members of the Institute, finally, may de­
cide both to repeal Rule 3.03 and to petition the appropriate regula­
tory agencies of the several states to adopt comparable rulings in­
corporating the substance of this Rule. Fortunately, more than a ma­
jority of the states are reported to have regulations which presently 
ban competitive bidding by accountants, and the reasons which 
have induced the promulgation of these rulings should be equally 
appealing to the regulatory agencies of the remaining states. Certainly 
officials responsible for the maintenance of accounting standards 
should be more receptive to public policing of competitive bidding 
than judges—who are directed to insure price competition—would be 
to any private prohibition thereof. In short, it would seem to be pref­
erable to ask state agencies to condone a restraint of price competi­
tion than to invite Federal courts to condemn it.
It is respectfully recommended, therefore, that the members of the 
Institute elect to repeal Rule 3.03 and to seek its replacement with 
comparable state regulations.
October 20 , 1966
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Text of the Covington & Burling Opinion
This letter is written to confirm our oral opinions heretofore given 
you concerning the legality under the United States antitrust laws of 
Rule 3.03 of the Code of Ethics of the Institute, which prohibits com­
petitive bidding; the possible legal consequences if the rule is unlaw­
ful; whether our opinion as to the legality of Rule 3.03 would apply 
to similar rules that may be contained in codes of ethics adopted by 
state societies; and whether your members will necessarily violate the 
antitrust laws if they obey rules prohibiting competitive bidding pro­
mulgated by state boards of accountancy or similar official agencies.
The relevant statute is the Sherman Act, which, in Section 1, de­
clares to be illegal “Every contract, combination . . .  or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations,” and, in Section 3, declares to be illegal similar con­
tracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce 
“in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia,” 
or “between any such Territory and another, or between any such 
Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Col­
umbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia 
and any State or States or foreign nations.”*
I.
Rule 3.03 reads as follows:
A member or associate shall not make a competitive bid for a 
professional engagement. Competitive bidding for public ac-  
* The conduct prohibited by these Sections may also offend Section 2 of 
the Act, as an attempt to monopolize or a combination or conspiracy to 
monopolize.
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counting services is not in the public interest, is a form of solici­
tation, and is unprofessional.
Whatever difficulties there may be in determining whether Rule 
3.03 applies in particular situations, its general meaning is clear. It 
means that the members of the Institute are not to attempt to obtain 
clients by engaging in price competition. It is, in effect, an agreement 
among the members that they will not engage in price competition.
Among the restraints of trade covered by Sections 1 and 3 of the 
Sherman Act are all agreements among competitors relating to prices. 
With respect to this aspect of those Sections this prohibition is often 
described as directed against price-fixing, but it is not confined to 
agreements to fix particular prices or to fix a particular price level or 
to agreements on uniform prices. It applies broadly to all agreements 
among competitors that suppress or restrain price competition in 
any way. As exemplary of the broad scope of the prohibition, we refer 
to United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., et al., 310 U.S. 150 
(1940), rehearing denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940), one of the leading 
cases holding that price-fixing agreements are unlawful and defining 
what is meant by price-fixing agreements. The Court in that case 
stated,
Any combination which tampers with price structures is en­
gaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of 
the price-fixing group were in no position to control the market, 
to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they 
would be directly interfering with the free play of market forces. 
The Act places all such schemes beyond the pale and protects 
that vital part of our economy against any degree of interfer­
ence. (310 U.S. at 221.)
In further elucidation the Court said:
Nor is it important that the prices paid by the combination 
were not fixed in the sense that they were uniform and inflexible. 
Price-fixing as used in the Trenton Potteries case has no such 
limited meaning. An agreement to pay or charge rigid, uniform 
prices would be an illegal agreement under the Sherman Act. 
But so would agreements to raise or lower prices whatever ma­
chinery for price-fixing was used. That price-fixing includes more 
than the mere establishment of uniform prices is clearly evi­
dent from the Trenton Potteries case itself, where this Court 
noted with approval Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375,
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in which a decree was affirmed which restrained a combination 
from “raising or lowering prices or fixing uniform prices” at 
which meats will be sold. Hence, prices are fixed within the 
meaning of the Trenton Potteries case if the range within which 
purchases or sales will be made is agreed upon, if the prices 
paid or charged are to be at a certain level or on ascending or 
descending scales, if they are to be uniform, or if by various 
formulae they are related to the market prices. They are fixed 
because they are agreed upon. And the fact that, as here, they 
are fixed at the fair going market price is immaterial. (310 U.S. 
at 222-3.)
Even the foregoing specific catalog of unlawful price-fixing arrange­
ments is not, and was not meant to be, all-inclusive. Thus in Sugar 
Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), for example, the 
Supreme Court held an arrangement unlawful even though it did not 
involve an agreement to charge a fixed price, or an agreement to 
raise or lower prices, or any formula related to market prices, or the 
like, but merely an agreement to adhere to publicly announced prices 
that the parties independently set themselves and were free to change 
at any time.
There seems no room for doubt that an arrangement under which 
the parties refuse to engage in competitive bidding is a price-fixing ar­
rangement under the Act. See Swift and Company v. United States, 
196 U.S. 375 (1905).
The courts have held not only that price agreements among com­
petitors are illegal but that they are illegal per se. This means, among 
other things, that such an agreement cannot be legally justified on any 
ground. It cannot be justified, for example, on the ground that the 
prices charged are not unreasonable. It cannot be justified on the 
ground that in the absence of the agreement prices would be higher; 
even an agreement to maintain a maximum price is unlawful per se. 
Kiefert-Stewart Co. v. loseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 
(1951). It cannot be justified on the ground that it is designed to 
prevent price competition that would lead to undesirable social or 
economic consequences. As the Supreme Court has said,
Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price cutting 
and the like appear throughout our history as ostensible justifi­
cations for price-fixing. If the so-called competitive abuses were 
to be appraised here, the reasonableness of prices would neces­
sarily become an issue in every price-fixing case. In that event 
the Sherman Act would soon be emasculated; its philosophy
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would be supplanted by one which is wholly alien to a system 
of free competition; it would not be the charter of freedom which 
its framers intended. (E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Company, Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 221.)
In the same opinion, the Court said:
Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or 
not particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or 
destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry of ruinous 
competition and competitive evils to be a defense to price-fixing 
conspiracies. It has no more allowed genuine or fancied com­
petitive abuses as a legal justification for such schemes than it 
has the good intentions of the members of the combination. If 
such a shift is to be made, it must be done by the Congress. 
Certainly Congress has not left us with any such choice. (310 
U.S. at 221-2.)
Perhaps as striking an example as any, of the fact that there can be 
no legal justification for any of the agreements or combinations that 
the Court has defined as illegal per se, is provided by Fashion Orig­
inators’ Guild of America, Inc., et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, 
312 U.S. 457 (1941), in which the Court held unlawful per se a com­
mercial boycott, even though the boycott was initiated to prevent style 
piracy and the Court assumed that such piracy constituted a legal wrong 
against the parties to the boycott.
In summary, an agreement like the one in Rule 3.03, if made by 
persons engaged in any ordinary interstate commercial activity would 
be plainly unlawful per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and 
would also be unlawful under Section 3 of the Sherman Act if car­
ried on in the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United 
States or in commerce between the District of Columbia or any Terri­
tory or any other place. This would be equally true if the persons in­
volved were engaged in supplying commercial services instead of a 
product. United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 
339 U.S. 485 (1950).
II.
The preceding discussion leads us to the conclusion that the pro­
hibition against price-fixing applies to Rule 3.03, unless for some reason 
the Sherman Act does not apply to agreements among accountants in
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the same way that it applies to agreements among those engaged in 
ordinary commercial activities. This raises three questions that de­
serve discussion:
( a ) The first is whether accounting services can ever be sufficiently 
interstate in character to be subject to the provisions of the Sherman 
Act. The application of Section 1 of the Act is limited to activities that 
restrain interstate commerce. It might be suggested that accounting 
is essentially a local activity, that accountants are not engaged in in­
terstate commerce, and that, accordingly, the provisions of Section 1 
of the Act do not apply to their activities.
In the past twenty years the courts have greatly expanded the con­
cept of interstate commerce. Activities that historically were regarded 
as local or intrastate have been held to be interstate in character. For 
example, the Supreme Court has held that insurance, which for de­
cades was held to be entirely local in character, is interstate com­
merce within the meaning of the Act. United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The scope of the op­
erations of modern accounting firms and the nature of the practice in 
which many accountants are engaged, are such that there is no rea­
son to believe that the courts would hold that the profession is gen­
erally and essentially local or intrastate in character. There are un­
doubtedly a substantial number of accountants whose practice is 
largely local and who do not use extensively the channels and instru­
mentalities of interstate commerce. But Rule 3.03 is not confined to 
accountants in that position; it applies generally to all accountants 
including those whose activities are undoubtedly interstate in charac­
ter.
Moreover, the courts have held that the prohibitions of the Sher­
man Act apply to activities that occur entirely within a single state, 
if the effect of those activities is to restrain competition in interstate 
commerce.
Taking into account all of these circumstances, it is our view that the 
application of Section 1 of the Act to Rule 3.03 could not be defeated 
on the ground that the Rule does not operate on or affect interstate 
commerce within the meaning of the statute.
There is one additional comment that is relevant here. Section 3 of 
the Sherman Act may be violated by activities that are conducted en­
tirely within the District of Columbia or one of the Territories of the 
United States and that have no impact on interstate commerce or 
commerce between the District of Columbia and a Territory and else­
where. By its terms Rule 3.03 is applicable to accounting services 
performed in the District of Columbia or in the Territories. Any
16
attempt to apply the rule to such activities in accordance with its 
terms would be subject to Section 3 even though no interstate com­
merce was involved.
(b) The second question is whether the Sherman Act applies 
to the professions. By its terms the statute applies to activities that 
restrain “trade or commerce.” It has sometimes been suggested that 
the practice of a profession, such as law, medicine or accounting, 
is not “trade or commerce” and that, accordingly, the Act does not 
apply to those engaged in a profession.
This suggestion was made, for example, by way of dictum in 
1922 in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League 
of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200. That case involved the 
question whether the Sherman Act was applicable to professional 
athletic performances. The Court, in holding that baseball exhibitions 
were not commerce and that the Act was therefore not applicable, 
used language that can be read as indicating that at that time the 
Court believed that the practice of law was not “trade or commerce” 
in the statutory sense. 259 U.S. at 209.
Subsequently, the Court in another baseball case followed the 
opinion in Federal Baseball, but only “so far as it ‘determines that 
Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within 
the scope of the federal antitrust laws.’ ” Toolson v. New York Yankees, 
Inc., et al., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Radovich v. National Football 
League et al., 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957). The Court did so, not because 
it believed Federal Baseball to have been correctly decided, but, as 
the Court explained, only because the baseball industry had made 
vast investments relying on the Court’s earlier opinion, because Con­
gress had seen fit to take no action in the premises, and because the 
Court believed that more harm than good would be done by over­
ruling the earlier opinion. 352 U.S. at 450. Indeed, with respect to all 
other professional sports, the Court in a later opinion made clear that 
Federal Baseball is inapplicable to them and that they are subject to 
the antitrust laws. E.g., Radovich v. National Football League et al., 
supra.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the procurement of 
medical and hospital services is subject to the Sherman Act, American 
Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), and al­
though in that case and others the Court has had an opportunity to 
reaffirm its Federal Baseball dictum concerning the inapplicability of 
the Act to a learned profession, it has expressly avoided passing on 
the question of whether the practice of medicine, or similar profes­
sional activity, is trade or commerce within the meaning of the Act.
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See, also, United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 
326 (1952); United States v. National Association of Real Estate 
Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
Accordingly, it is correct to say that the Supreme Court has never 
passed on the question of whether the practice of law, medicine or 
accounting is “trade or commerce” within the meaning of the Sherman 
Act. That Court has applied the Sherman Act to a provision in a code 
of ethics adopted by an association of real estate brokers. United 
States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, supra. The pro­
vision involved standard rates of commission and provided that no 
business should be solicited at lower rates. In its opinion in that case, 
the Supreme Court said that it was expressing no view on the question 
whether the Sherman Act applied to the professions. Accordingly, the 
decision can be regarded only as a holding by the Supreme Court 
that real estate brokers are not engaged in a profession.
However, twenty years ago the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia, in a carefully written opinion, held that the practice 
of medicine is trade or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman 
Act. United States v. American Medical Ass’n et al., 110 F.2d 703 
(1940). The opinion elaborately documented the fact that both in the 
United States and in England the concept of “restraint of trade” 
was applied at common law to the professions, as well as to other 
callings and activities, and the opinion pointed out that the Supreme 
Court has on numerous occasions recognized the relevance of the 
common law to the construction of the Sherman Act. At a later stage 
of the proceedings in the American Medical case, in another carefully 
considered opinion written on behalf of a substantially different panel 
of judges, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reaf­
firmed its previous opinion. American Medical Ass’n v. United States, 
130 F.2d 233 (1942). And very recently the same Court, but with 
an entirely different panel of judges, tersely reaffirmed its AM A  
opinions. Levin v. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 
354 F.2d 515 (1965).
There is one holding by a single district judge that is contrary 
to the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
that have been cited above. See United States v. Oregon State Medical 
Society, 95 F. Supp. 103 (1950). The opinion in that case did not 
discuss or analyze the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Dis­
trict of Columbia or the authorities on which those decisions relied, 
and it is to be noted that the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of 
the District Court on other grounds without approving or adopting 
the holding that the practice of medicine is not trade or commerce 
within the meaning of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Oregon 
State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
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Although state cases construing state antitrust laws are not con­
trolling on the question with which we are here concerned, they are 
not entirely without relevance.
In Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Soc., et al., 
237 P.2d 737 (Wash. 1951), the Washington Supreme Court was 
concerned with the application of an antitrust provision of Washing­
ton’s Constitution to the professions. The particular provision pro­
hibits any person from combining or contracting with any other per­
son “for the purpose of fixing the price or limiting the production 
or regulating the transportation of any product or commodity.” The 
Court held that the word “product” should be construed to include 
professional services. Its reason was stated as follows:
As our constitutional provision bespeaks the common law, so 
it should be permitted to afford the same protection and serve 
the same broad public interest which is available at common law. 
Monopolies affecting price or production in essential service 
trades and professions can be as harmful to the public interest 
as monopolies in the sale or production of tangible goods. The 
constitutional provision was designed to safeguard this public in­
terest from whatever direction it may be assailed. The language 
used must therefore be liberally construed with that end in view. 
(237 P.2d at 765.)
In Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hospital Association et al., 376 
P.2d 568 (Cal. 1962), the California Supreme Court was concerned 
with whether a California antitrust statute, known as “the Cartwright 
Act,” applies to the professions. The Cartwright Act makes unlawful 
any “trust,” which is defined as “a combination of capital, skill or acts 
by two or more persons” for a number of purposes including the fol­
lowing: “(a) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce, 
(b ) To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of mer­
chandise or of any commodity, (c) To prevent competition in manu­
facturing, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, 
produce or any commodity.” The Court held that inasmuch as the 
language of the Act did not include the term “profession,” the pro­
fessions were not intended to be subject to it. The Court’s reason for 
so holding was that in other contemporaneous antitrust legislation 
passed at the same time as the Cartwright Act,
. . . the word “profession” was included among the terms describ­
ing the scope of the legislation, notwithstanding the fact that the 
words “trade” and “business” were also used. . . .  The difference 
in terminology between this section and the Cartwright Act may
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be viewed as indicating the act was not intended to apply to the 
professions. (376 P.2d at 570.)
The Court went on, however, to hold that as to matters not covered 
by the Cartwright Act the common law on restraints on trade applied, 
that at common law restraints on the practice of medicine were unlaw­
ful, and that, therefore, plaintiff had a common law action for being 
excluded from hospital privileges by the defendant hospital. The de­
cision can, therefore, be regarded as holding that the practice of medi­
cine is a trade within the meaning of the common law rules.
Our review of the decisions in the Federal courts discussed above, 
and of a number of other cases in which the Supreme Court has 
shown a disposition to give the Sherman Act broad application, leads 
us to conclude that it is likely that the Supreme Court would hold 
that the professions do not enjoy any general immunity from the 
application of the Sherman Act.
We see nothing in the two Texas cases to which our attention has 
been called that reflects adversely on the foregoing conclusion. The 
cases are Cochran County v. W est Audit Co. et al., 10 S.W.2d 229 
(Tex. Civ. App., 1928), and Stephens County v. J. N. McCannon, Inc., 
52 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Sup. Ct., 1932). These cases hold, respectively, 
that a Texas statute requiring the letting of certain contracts on com­
petitive bids does not apply to a contract for accounting services 
or to a contract for architectural services. Neither case has any bearing 
whatever on the question of whether the Sherman Act is applicable 
to an agreement between professional persons not to engage in com­
petitive bidding.
(c) The third question is whether the courts, without giving the 
professions any general immunity from the Sherman Act, might apply 
more lenient standards to the rules and regulations of professional 
societies than they apply to ordinary commercial activities and hold 
that rules designed to preserve professional ethical standards are per­
missible even though analogous rules might be unlawful in an ordinary 
commercial context. There is one passage that suggests this possibility 
in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Oregon State Medical 
case, 343 U.S. at 336. It is our opinion, however, that the Supreme 
Court is not likely to adopt any rule of law that would permit the 
members of a professional association to engage in price-fixing agree­
ments or combinations. The Supreme Court does not look with favor 
upon broad exemptions from the Sherman Act and certainly it does 
not look with favor on any relaxations of the prohibition against 
arrangements that restrict price competition. The Court might permit 
the members of a professional association to adopt certain kinds of
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regulations designed to prevent unethical conduct, as, for example, a 
rule against advertising or actual solicitation. But any indulgence that 
the Court might show the professions in this respect would, we be­
lieve, be limited and would not be likely to extend so far as to allow 
the members of the associations to engage in price-fixing or to adopt 
rules of conduct that restrict price competition.
On the basis of this analysis we believe it necessary to conclude 
that, if the legality of Rule 3.03 should ever be challenged in a pro­
ceeding brought under the Sherman Act, it is highly probable that the 
Rule would be held to be unlawful.
In arriving at the opinion expressed above on the legality of Rule 
3.03 we considered the fact that in 1957 the Ethics Committee of the 
American Bar Association issued an opinion that competitive bidding 
was unethical under the Canons of Ethics of the Association forbid­
ding solicitation or advertising (Opinion 292). We do not regard 
this opinion as authoritative on the legal question now under con­
sideration. The American Bar Association has no canon of ethics di­
rected against competitive bidding, and the opinion represents simply 
the opinion of those persons who happened to be members of the 
Ethics Committee at that time on the interpretation and application 
of the Canons that forbid solicitation or advertising. There is no in­
dication in the opinion that the members of the Committee considered 
the possible application of the Sherman Act to the particular interpre­
tation of the Canons that they were adopting. In this connection it 
should be observed that the Ethics Committee of the American Bar 
Association has said in a number of its opinions that it does not pass 
on questions of law. We seriously doubt whether the Ethics Com­
mittee of the American Bar Association today would issue a similar 
opinion, particularly if the members were required to consider the 
significance of the opinion in relation to the possible application of the 
Sherman Act. Our doubt is supported by the present position of the 
American Bar Association on the question of minimum fee schedules. 
The June 1966 issue of Legal Economic News, which is published by 
the Standing Committee on Economics of Law Practice of the Amer­
ican Bar Association, discusses the policy of the Association on min­
imum fee schedules. The policy is not to endorse mandatory minimum 
fee schedules but to regard all fee schedules as advisory only. The 
matter of minimum fee schedules, relating as it does to charges for 
professional services, is so closely akin to competitive bidding that it is 
reasonable to regard the Bar Association’s policy on the question of 
minimum fee schedules as throwing light upon the attitude of the Bar 
Association toward any absolute and unqualified rule with respect to 
the practices of its members concerning pricing for services.
In any case we should like to emphasize that the opinion that we
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have expressed on the legality of Rule 3.03 does not rest on any as­
sumption that the status of the legal profession under the Sherman 
Act differs in any significant respect from the status of the accounting 
profession.
III.
The possible legal consequences, should the question of the legality 
of Rule 3.03 be raised and adversely decided in a legal proceeding, 
would depend upon the kind of legal proceeding in which the de­
cision was made.
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice can bring 
criminal proceedings to punish violations of the Act. These proceed­
ings are usually initiated by an indictment returned by a grand jury. 
The Institute itself could be the defendant in such a proceeding. A 
member of its Council or any of its officers or agents, who had auth­
orized, ordered or done anything to enforce, to apply or to interpret 
Rule 3.03 might also be a defendant. Any defendant found guilty in a 
criminal proceeding may be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned 
for not more than one year, or both. These penalties may be imposed 
for each offense under each section of the statute. Thus, in a case that 
involved violation of both Section 1 and Section 3 a fine in excess 
of $50,000 could be imposed.
The Antitrust Division could, in addition to a criminal suit, also 
bring a civil suit to enjoin the enforcement of Rule 3.03. To win a suit 
of that kind the Antitrust Division would merely have to convince the 
court that Rule 3.03 was unlawful. It would not have to prove any 
injury or money damage to anyone. If the Antitrust Division should 
win that suit, the court not only could enjoin the Institute and its 
members from enforcing the Rule but could also affirmatively require 
the Institute to abolish the Rule.
The Antitrust Division can also sue to recover simple damages 
in any case in which the enforcing of the Rule has inflicted money 
damage upon the United States or any of its agencies. In a case of that 
kind the Antitrust Division would have to prove the United States 
or one of its agencies had actually suffered money damage that was 
caused by Rule 3.03.
Private persons are also entitled to sue under the antitrust laws. 
A private person is entitled to sue and recover treble damages, plus 
a reasonable attorney’s fee, for any injury inflicted upon it by a viola­
tion of the antitrust laws. To succeed in a suit of this kind a private 
person would have to prove that in fact he had suffered money dam­
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age because of the effects of enforcement of Rule 3.03. A private 
person can also sue for injunctive relief. This means that a private 
person could sue the Institute, the members of its Trial Board or 
others to prevent them from enforcing Rule 3.03 against him.
As long as Rule 3.03 remains in the Code of Ethics there is a risk 
that something may occur that would cause someone to challenge 
the legality of the Rule by one or more of the various forms of legal 
proceedings that have been described. This might happen, for ex­
ample, if the Institute should enforce the Rule against some individual 
member, either by expelling him from the Institute or by suspending 
his membership. If that should happen, the individual might com­
plain to the Department of Justice and be successful in instigating 
action by the Antitrust Division. The individual might also seek to 
avail himself of the private remedies described above.
The challenge to the legality of the Rule might be instituted by 
someone who is aggrieved because he could not obtain competitive 
bids for accounting services. This might happen, for example, in the 
case of a municipal agency or corporation which was unable to obtain 
competitive bids because members of the Institute were complying 
with the Rule. The agency or corporation might institute legal pro­
ceedings on its own as a private person or it might complain to the 
Department of Justice and thus instigate the Antitrust Division to 
start proceedings. The same thing could happen in the case of a Fed­
eral agency of some kind which had been thwarted in its attempt to 
get competitive bids. While the Federal agency probably could not 
sue independently, it could certainly complain to the Antitrust Di­
vision and it must be assumed that its complaint would get very 
serious attention.
It is not possible to predict with certainty that any of these things 
will happen or to estimate in precise terms the risk that they will 
occur. It should not be assumed, however, that they will not occur 
merely because Rule 3.03 has been in the Code of Ethics for many 
years and has never been attacked as a violation of the antitrust laws. 
There have been a number of instance in which practices of long 
standing whose legality has generally been assumed have been suc­
cessfully attacked under the antitrust laws. One well-known example 
is the successful suit that the Antitrust Division brought against in­
surance companies even though the courts had held for many years 
that the business of insurance was not interstate commerce. United 
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, supra.
In this connection it should be noted that the Antitrust Division 
has not hesitated to bring criminal or civil proceedings against profes­
sional organizations on the ground that their activities have violated
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the antitrust laws. It brought the criminal proceeding against the 
American Medical Association and the Medical Association of the 
District of Columbia, and the civil proceeding against the Oregon 
State Medical Society which resulted in the decisions that have been 
discussed earlier in this opinion. In July of this year the Antitrust 
Division filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois against The College of American 
Pathologists. The complaint charged the defendants with fixing prices 
for conducting and reporting bioanalytical tests made by medical 
laboratories. It also charged that the defendants had combined to re­
strict the performance of these services to medical laboratories owned 
or operated by pathologists. There is some reason to believe that this 
case may involve the legality of rules of professional conduct adopted 
by The College of American Pathologists.
IV.
W hat has been said so far about the legality of Rule 3.03 also ap­
plies to similar rules that may be contained in codes of ethics adopted 
by state societies. Insofar as the rules of state societies operate only 
on intrastate activities and have no effect on interstate commerce they 
are not subject to the Federal antitrust laws. But to the extent that 
those rules affect the conduct of members who are engaged in inter­
state commerce, as many members of state societies undoubtedly are, 
the rules of law that have been discussed above would apply.
In many states, boards of accountancy or other state agencies have 
adopted rules of professional conduct that prohibit competitive bid­
ding. We understand that there are thirty-seven states in which a 
state agency has promulgated a rule of this kind.
In 1943 the Supreme Court held in a case arising in California that 
state action, or official action directed by a state, that results in re­
straint of trade is not prohibited by the Sherman Act. Parker v. Brown, 
317 U.S. 341. Under the general principle announced by the Supreme 
Court in that case and cognate cases, a rule against competitive bid­
ding issued by a state board should not be subject to attack as a 
violation of the Sherman Act. It follows that members of the Insti­
tute who comply with the state regulation prohibiting the making of 
competitive bids could not be successfully prosecuted by the Anti­
trust Division or sued by a private litigant under the antitrust laws.
For this principle to apply, two conditions must be satisfied. First, 
state regulation must be in conformity with state law. This means 
that the state agency that issues the rule must have authority under
24
state law to promulgate a rule prohibiting competitive bidding. It 
also means that a state agency must issue a rule against competitive 
bidding in conformity with any procedures the state law requires a 
state agency to follow. (For example, if state law requires that rules 
of professional conduct be issued only after notice and a public hear­
ing, then the state agency must have complied with that requirement.)
Second, the state board or other agency that issues a rule must be 
an agency which is established and controlled by the state so that it is 
clear that the action of the agency is state action and not simply ac­
tion taken by a private group. This point may be amplified in this way: 
A state law might authorize accountants or members of other pro­
fessions to issue regulations covering their professional conduct. The 
decisions indicate, however, that this kind of permissive legislation 
does not authorize an association of private persons to issue rules of 
professional conduct that violate the antitrust laws. In addition to 
Parker v. Brown, supra, see also Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, 
Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 263 F.2d 502 ( 4th Cir. 1959); 
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690 
(1962) (discussion of action taken by defendant under permissive 
Canadian statute). Rules of professional conduct are not immune from 
application of the antitrust laws unless they are issued, commanded 
and enforced by an official agency that is established and controlled 
by the state. To reach a final opinion as to the situation in a particular 
state, it would be necessary to make a detailed and careful review of 
the statutes in that state to determine whether its statutes authorize 
the state board to issue the regulation in question. It would also be 
necessary to make a careful and detailed review of the state statutes 
that govern the procedures and practices of the state board to de­
termine whether the board was a true agency of the state and whether 
its action was official state action. We have not attempted to make 
that kind of detailed review and the present discussion is designed 
merely to indicate the standards that should be applied in making 
such a review.
September 28 , 1966
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